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ASEAN: A Prime Example of Regionalism in Southeast Asia
♦
Katja Weber
 
 
♣
          Following World War II, the Southeast Asian countries gradually gained independence 
from their colonizers, but only to become part of the Cold War struggle between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, and “a battleground in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union” 
(Narine 2002: 10).  The perception of external threat, therefore, was an essential component in the 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to create a basis for comparisons with other examples of regionalism such as the 
European Union, NAFTA, the African Union, or Mercosur, to name but a few.  To facilitate this 
task, I divided the paper into the following nine subheadings: 
 
1.) Historical Background 
2.) Rationale for Regionalism/Integration, Main Developments and Expansion 
3.) Legal Framework 
4.) Institutions/Decision-Making 
5.) Economy 
6.) Security 
7.) External Relations 
8.) Theories 
9.) Setbacks and Prospects 
 
Historical Background   
 
Since, as Frank Frost (1990: 2) explains, “geographic characteristics of the area discouraged 
regular contact and communication, the ancient kingdoms of Southeast Asia developed largely in 
isolation from each other.”  Yet, easy access by sea left the region vulnerable to interference by 
external powers and thus, by the nineteenth century, Southeast Asians became victims of 
European colonialism.  During World War II, Japan expelled the Western colonial powers from 
the region and subjected it to a brutal occupation.   
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promotion of regionalism in Southeast Asia, along-side concerns regarding intra-regional 
predators and internal communist insurgencies.  
         Given  the great uncertainty surrounding the behavior of the USSR and China in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the US took a first step to promote regionalism in Southeast 
Asia.  In 1954, together with France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Pakistan, the US founded the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to 
prevent communism from gaining ground in the region.  However since, “[u]nlike NATO, 
SEATO had no independent mechanism for obtaining intelligence or deploying military forces, 
[its] … potential for collective action was necessarily limited.”
i
         Mindful not to provoke other countries in the region, like Vietnam, but also unable to see 
eye-to-eye on security matters, and lacking the military means to bring about a credible security 
apparatus, the ASEAN members carefully spelled out in the Bangkok Declaration that their main 
goals shall be: “to accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in 
  SEATO held annual joint 
military exercises and engaged in consultation, but suffered from a lack of “credibility” and 
therefore was disbanded in 1977.  Another attempt at promoting regional order was made by the 
South Korean president Park Chung-hee with the creation of the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) 
in 1966, but this grouping of anti-communist states disintegrated in 1972. 
         The next two efforts to establish order were made exclusively by Southeast Asian countries, 
without any outside help.  In 1961 Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand gave rise to the  
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).  Whereas Malaya and the Philippines preferred an 
arrangement with significant institutional structures, Thailand favored a much less binding 
commitment and eventually got its way.  The ASA ran into trouble when the Philippines decided 
to lay claim on Sabah (territory which the British had intended to include in the proposed 
Federation of Malaysia).  This dispute between the Philippines and what then became known as 
Malaysia (an amalgamation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak) rendered the ASA 
ineffective for the following years.   
        MAPHILINDO (a grouping of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) was founded in 
1963, but was weakened significantly shortly after it had come about, due to the creation of the 
Federation of Malaysia which neither Indonesia nor the Philippines recognized (Narine 2002: 10-
12).  Between 1963 and 1966, President Sukarno of Indonesia then pursued konfrontasi--a policy 
of confrontation and regional disruption--with Malaysia and Singapore, once the latter had been 
expelled from Malaysia in 1965.  The idea was to destabilize Malaysia through limited military 
action, economic sanctions and propaganda.  Konfrontasi  finally ended when Sukarno was 
deposed by the military in 1966.   
         Even though both the ASA and MAPHILINDO collapsed, due to the above described 
internal hostilities, they were important precursors of ASEAN (Frost 1990: 4).  The disputes 
between these countries made the need for regional cooperation abundantly clear and, ultimately, 
led to new discussions which on August 8, 1967, gave rise to ASEAN.   
 
Rationale for Regionalism/Integration, Main Developments and Expansion 
 
By founding ASEAN, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines hoped to 
accomplish three main objectives.  First, they sought to reduce tensions and competition among 
themselves, i.e., Southeast Asia’s non-communist states.  Second, they hoped that by promoting 
domestic socio-economic development, it would be easier for them to tackle internal communist 
challenges and/or deal with externally sponsored communist insurgencies.  Third, they sought to 
reduce the regional military influence of external actors by expressly stating that foreign military 
bases in the region should be temporary (Narine 2002: 13).  Since most of the ASEAN states are 
still “deeply engaged in the process of state-building,…their most important concern is to 
maintain and promote their rights and security as sovereign states” (ibid. p. 3).  Or, put 
differently, when it comes to ranking norms, sovereignty wins out over all others.  
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the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership…[and] to promote 
regional peace and stability.”
ii  But, much like in the case of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), “security concerns and political purposes were never far from the ASEAN 
founders’ intentions.”
iii  
         As the Corregidor Affair in 1968 proves, ASEAN was off to a rough start.  Allegations that 
the Philippines were using the island to train Muslim insurgents to infiltrate Sabah led to a 
diplomatic row between Malaysia and the Philippines and, eventually, to the cancellation of 
ASEAN meetings.  Only when changes in their external environment (Britain’s announcement 
that it would accelerate its withdrawal from Southeast Asia; Nixon’s claim that the US would 
limit its involvement in Southeast Asia; the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict; the spread 
of war from Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia) drove home the need for renewed cooperation, did 
Malaysia and the Philippines resume normal relations in December 1969 (Narine 2002: 19).  
         Recognizing that it would be difficult to attain domestic stability and socio-economic 
development as long as external powers would be able to intervene in their affairs, on November 
26-27, 1971, the foreign ministers of ASEAN met in Kuala Lumpur and signed a Declaration of a 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia.  The purpose of this 
political statement of intent was to neutralize Southeast Asia and the signatories envisioned a 
two-pronged strategy to get there.  First, the Southeast Asian states should support non-
aggression principles and respect each others’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.  And, 
secondly, the major powers (the US, the USSR, and China) should guarantee Southeast Asia’s 
neutrality and assure that the region would not become an area of conflict between them.  
         The collapse of anticommunist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 hit home 
the need for economic development to counter the internal appeal of communism in ASEAN 
countries.  To improve ASEAN’s internal stability, the ASEAN heads of state met in Bali in 
February 1976 and reached two crucial agreements, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).  Whereas the former, largely,   
defined areas of economic cooperation (with respect to basic commodities; large-scale industrial 
projects; intraregional trade liberalization; joint approaches to world economic problems) and 
suggested annual summits of ASEAN’s economic ministers, the latter focused on security issues 
obliging the member states to settle their disputes peacefully through consultation.  TAC, as 
Narine (2002: 23) explains, served as ASEAN’s “code of conduct,” spelling out its fundamental 
principles which will be examined in more detail below, and as a non-aggression pact. 
         Although, as can be seen with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (then known as 
Kampuchea) from 1978 to 1990, at times, there was a significant degree of cohesion among the 
ASEAN member states, different threat perceptions repeatedly led to different policy 
prescriptions, making it difficult for the organization to speak with one voice.  More important 
still, systemic constraints made it virtually impossible for ASEAN to control its regional security 
environment as it saw fit.  While the great powers placed limits on what ASEAN could 
accomplish, it is important to understand that, “without the diplomatic and military support of the 
United States and…China, ASEAN would not have been able to oppose Vietnam” (Narine 2002: 
59).  ASEAN, thus decided to introduce resolutions at the UN General Assembly in which it 
“called for a durable and comprehensive  political settlement in Cambodia” and for which it 
received consistent support from the international community.
iv  Finally, on 23 October 1991, the 
Paris Conference on Cambodia produced the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodian Conflict. 
         To mention but one further security provision, at the Bangkok Summit in December 1995 
the leaders of the ASEAN countries signed the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone (SEANWFZ).  With this treaty, which came into force on 27 March 1997, the 
signatories declared their determination to “take concrete action which will contribute to the 
progress towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and to the promotion of 
international peace and security.”
v  
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         Thus, over time, ASEAN spelled out various principles, norms and rules that were to guide 
the conduct of its members, i.e., it increased its substance.  Before taking a closer look at the 
organization’s legal framework, institutions, and decision-making procedures, however, another 
development that occurred simultaneously deserves mention, namely ASEAN’s expansion. 
         As discussed above, ASEAN started out with five founding members: Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines.  Brunei was added in 1984.  For political, economic 
and security reasons ASEAN then brought the mainland Southeast Asian states on board 
(Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995; Myanmar and Laos in 1997; and Cambodia in 1999), thinking 
that it should seize the window of opportunity which the end of the Cold War had opened.  The 
members hoped that an ASEAN of ten countries would have a more substantial voice in 
international economic and security discussions, that the organization would be in a better 
position to compete with great powers in the region like China, Japan, and India, that it would 
have greater economic appeal, and be in a better position to promote peace and stability (Narine 
2002: 113).  
        The latest round of enlargement not only increased the member-state population from 340 
million people to more than 500 million, but it also made an already heterogeneous grouping of 
states--in terms of size differences, ethnic diversity, level of development and wealth--even more 
so.  This suggests that, with even more diverse economic and political views, consensus may be 
even harder to reach.  Now that ASEAN includes communist governments (Vietnam and Laos) 
and an authoritarian military regime (Myanmar) alongside liberal democracies, it may have to be 
even more informal to accommodate the views of the new members.  In fact, as Henderson (1999: 
13) explains, it now is not uncommon that “[i]mpetus for change among some original ASEAN 
countries is countered by the conservatism of new ones.”  
        Another problem is the uncertainty regarding Vietnam’s future behavior.  Will it resume its 
traditional role and compete with Thailand?  Will it challenge Indonesia’s aspirations as regional 
leader?  Not to speak of Myanmar which, presently, exposes ASEAN to a variety of security 
threats in the form of refugee flows, cross-border incursions, drug production, and AIDS (Narine 
2002: 113-116). 
  
Legal Framework 
 
ASEAN consists of a series of basic documents that make up its legal framework.  First, in the 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967 the founding members spelled out the aims and purposes of the 
organization (see above).  The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 27 November 1971 then established 
a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, free from any interference by outside 
powers.  On February 24, 1976 in Bali the Declaration of ASEAN Concord was signed to 
“expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields.”  During the 
same meeting the ASEAN members once more discussed the purpose, but also principles, of the 
organization and codified them in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).   
 
         TAC in Chapter I, Article 2 defines ASEAN’s fundamental principles as: 
        mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, 
and national identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in 
the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful 
manner; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among 
themselves.
vi 
 
         Among legal commitments sovereign equality is paramount and therefore members’ rights 
as sovereign states need to be respected at all times.  In the event that conflict should occur, TAC 
stresses in Chapter IV, it needs to be resolved in a non-confrontational way.  
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        Other legally-binding basic documents deal with economic cooperation (Agreement on the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff [CEPT] Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
Singapore, 28 January 1992; Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Bangkok, 15 December 1995), security issues (Treaty on the 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, 15 December 1995; Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 2002), and the future of regional cooperation (ASEAN 
Vision 2020 [1997]).
vii  
 
 
 
Institutions/Decision-Making  
 
When ASEAN was founded, the Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) of ASEAN foreign 
ministers was the main decision-making body.  The ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) was in 
charge of daily affairs.  In addition, ASEAN National Secretariats were created and became part 
of the Foreign Ministries of the ASEAN states.  Even though ASEAN produced hundreds of 
recommendations during its early period, few were ever implemented (Narine 2002: 16).   
         Following the Bali Summit in 1976 ASEAN was restructured.  The organization now held 
occasional Heads of Government meetings, but AMM remained the de facto governing body.  
After 1976, Economic Ministers’ Meetings were introduced which, over time, became the most 
important decision-making arena in the economic realm.  Moreover, ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conferences (ASEAN-PMC) with ASEAN dialogue partners were institutionalized, and Senior 
Officials Meetings (SOM) held to facilitate political dialogue.  A central ASEAN Secretariat was 
also created along with several functional committees.
viii  
         The Singapore Summit of 1992 brought additional changes to ASEAN’s basic 
organizational structure.  The heads of government would meet every three years now and 
schedule informal get-togethers in the interim, as needed.  The ASEAN Secretary General was 
given ministerial status, and the Secretariat was revamped and would also including one deputy 
secretary-general, four bureau directors, eleven assistant directors, and eight senior officers 
(Narine 2002: 101).   
         As a result of the steadily increasing number of issues to be discussed at any given time, 
ASEAN Heads of State and Government meet annually now in ASEAN summits (the 
organization’s highest decision-making body).  Each of these summits is preceded by a Joint 
Ministerial Meeting of the foreign and economic ministers.  The ASEAN Standing Committee 
(ASC), chaired by the foreign minister of the country that holds the chairmanship, coordinates the 
work of ASEAN in between the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM).  And, the ASEAN 
Secretariat has to “initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities.”
ix
        What sets the organization apart from many other regional institutions is its own process of 
decision-making, typically referred to as the “ASEAN Way.”  Based on the Malay cultural 
practices of musjawarah  and  mufukat, the idea is to reach agreement via consultation and 
  Moreover, in 
2003, ASEAN leaders vowed to establish an ASEAN Community consisting of three main 
pillars: an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community, and an ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community.   
         Thus, as it stands today, “ASEAN (with its enhanced secretariat, regularized summits, as 
well as more regular informal heads of government meetings, its varied ministerial and official 
level meetings, and dialogues with extra-regional states…),” in the mind of Henderson (1999: 
24), “can lay claim to being the most extensively institutionalized (but not supra-nationalized) 
regional association besides the European Union.”  But, due to its unwillingness to sacrifice 
sovereignty, ASEAN has retained a clear preference for informal mechanisms over legalistic 
institutions.  In fact, it outright rejects any form of supra-national decision-making and, if need 
be, is prepared to settle for lowest common denominator decisions.  
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consensus, respectively (Narine 2002: 31).  Should there be obstacles in the way that may prevent 
cooperation in a particular issue area, ASEAN members should be willing to move issues aside 
and proceed with consultation in another area.  By holding its members to a specific code of 
conduct, the organization seeks to contain problems and, over time, build a regional 
consciousness, if not regional identity.  It is also noteworthy that the principle of sovereign 
equality prevents a state from holding a legitimate claim to leadership.  Indonesia which, on 
account of its size and large population, clearly is interested in a leadership position, has to settle 
for what Henderson (1999: 17) characterizes as “leading from behind.”  
 
 
Economy 
 
A 1969 UN study suggested ASEAN members should bring about some kind of economic union 
to take advantage of economies of scale at the regional level.  Progress in economic cooperation 
has been slow, however, due to a number of problems.  First, ASEAN trade is mostly oriented 
toward the global market, i.e., ASEAN members have extensive economic links with 
industrialized countries, but there is little intra-ASEAN trade.  As Frost (1990: 10) explains,   
“[h]istorically, four out of five of the original ASEAN members developed as suppliers of 
primary products and industrial raw materials for world markets.  The fifth, Singapore, developed 
as a service centre for the British Empire in the Far East and as a centre for trade in commodities 
from nearby states.  In the mid-1960s, …Singapore developed rapidly into a manufacturing and 
financial centre.”  Second, ASEAN members hold different attitudes toward international trade.  
Whereas Singapore and Brunei are open and outward looking, Indonesia has traditionally been 
highly protectionist, and in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, open and protected sectors 
co-exist (Frost 1990: 11).  Third, “ASEAN’s efforts to foster intraregional economic cooperation 
were stymied both by a lack of complementarity and by outright competition between most of its 
members” (Narine 2002: 27). 
        To promote greater economic cooperation, in 1976, ASEAN members signed the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord.  One year later, ASEAN introduced preferential trading 
arrangements (PTA)s.   But even though tariffs were reduced for ASEAN products, they 
remained high enough to stifle significant trade.  “By 1990, despite listing almost 16,000 
products, the PTA covered less than 1 percent of intra-ASEAN trade” (Narine 2002: 28).  In 
addition to creating PTAs, ASEAN has experimented with the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP), 
ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) 
schemes to promote industrial cooperation, but with very mixed results (Chatterjee 1990: 68-70).  
Thus, during the Cold War, ASEAN as an economic institution was clearly a failure or, at best, of 
limited economic significance.   The fact that its members were largely oriented outward with 
respect to trade, and, for the most part, were unable to reach agreement on what economic 
policies to pursue, severely undermined the effectiveness of the organization.  And yet, there was 
a silver lining in ASEAN’s ability to mitigate disputes which enhanced regional stability and, 
ultimately, led to a better investment climate. 
         Given China’s emergence as a major competitor for foreign direct investment, at the 1991 
ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, Thailand proposed ASEAN create an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) for manufactures, to be established within fifteen years.  Officially launched in 
January 1992, AFTA called for the “reduction of tariffs on all intra-ASEAN trade in 
manufactures, processed agricultural products, and capital goods to a 0-5 percent range within 
fifteen years, starting in 1993” (Narine 2002: 127).  Due to an increasingly rapid rate of 
competition, AFTA’s completion date was moved up from 2008 to 2003.  “As of 1 January 2005, 
tariffs on almost 99 percent of the products in the Inclusion List of the ASEAN-6 (Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) have been reduced to 
no more than 5 percent.  More than 60 percent of these products have zero tariffs.  The average  
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tariff for ASEAN-6 has been brought down from more than 12 percent when AFTA started to 2 
percent today.”
x  Later agreements, known as “AFTA plus,” sought to harmonize customs and 
product standards (Henderson 1999: 22). 
         To move toward an ASEAN Economic Community (as outlined in ASEAN Vision 2020), 
ASEAN seeks to “institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its 
existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); to accelerate 
regional integration…in priority sectors…[like] air travel…electronics, fisheries…tourism,” etc.
xi  
ASEAN countries have also agreed to create a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) designed to 
address all disputes arising from intra-ASEAN economic cooperation.  Ultimately, the goal is “to 
create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a 
free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic 
development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in the year 2020.”
xii  
         Yet, despite these recent moves toward greater integration, the fact that the level of intra-
trade relations remains low (compared to external trade) clearly diminishes the significance of 
ASEAN as an economic actor.  “For most of the 1990s,” Narine (2002: 132) explains, “intra-
ASEAN trade hovered around 20 percent of total ASEAN trade.”  By contrast, about 40% of 
NAFTA trade takes place between member states; and EU intra-regional trade is about 70% (ibid 
133). 
        There has also been some monetary coordination.  In 1972, the Special Committee of 
ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities was created to promote regional financial 
cooperation.  Following the Bali Summit of 1976, ASEAN created the Committee on Finance and 
Banking (COFAB).  Five years later, in June 1981, the ASEAN Finance Corporation (AFC) 
started operating, providing equity capital and loans to ASEAN projects.  Due to the small scale 
of the operation (total assets of $121 million in 1985), as Chatterjee (1990: 71-4) makes clear, 
AFC’s performance was modest.  
        Much like discussed above for the economic realm, “divergent economic policies and 
different levels of development…prevent [ASEAN] from taking a coherent and coordinated 
position on regional financial reform” (Narine 2002: 161).  As will be seen below, during the 
early stages of the Asian financial crisis, Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF); but strong opposition by the US and the IMF were enough to kill the proposal.  Renewed 
discussions regarding an Asian financial institution are now taking place in ASEAN Plus Three 
(ASEAN plus Japan, South Korea and China), but for such an institution to have any chance of 
succeeding, the Asian countries would first have to overcome their many tensions.  Nevertheless, 
two ideas are currently being discussed: an AMF as an Asian arm of the IMF, or an AMF that 
would replace the IMF in Asia.  But, since leading an AMF could bring Japan into conflict with 
the US, or further exacerbate the rivalry between China and Japan, prospects for an Asian 
financial institution are dim at the moment.  
 
Security  
 
Although security considerations played a crucial role in the founding of ASEAN it refused to 
present itself as security bloc.  Instead, via ZOPFAN, ASEAN pursued an isolationist foreign 
policy and the Philippines and Thailand relied predominately on their bilateral alliances with the 
US to protect themselves against external threats.  In the late 1980s and 1990s, numerous bilateral 
military arrangements between ASEAN members also began to flourish and they engaged in joint 
military exercises (Narine 2002: 71).  At the same time, an arms buildup took place to be able to 
deal with unresolved disputes.  For instance, during the 1990s, disputes occurred over fishing and 
illegal Thai immigrants to Malaysia.  Moreover, Indonesia and Malaysia engaged in a dispute 
over the islands of Ligitan and Sipidan, and there were ethnic tensions between Singapore and 
Malaysia (Narine 2002: 73).    
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         In addition to facing intra-regional challenges, in the post-Cold War era, ASEAN countries 
are confronted with new transnational challenges (terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, energy security, maritime security, etc.), greater uncertainty regarding the behavior of 
the Great Powers in the region, and the fear of US isolationism.  These changed circumstances 
necessitated a reassessment of existing security provisions and made clear that ASEAN needed to 
be adapted.  Since, in this post-Cold War environment in which shifts in the regional balance of 
power are externally driven, ASEAN can no longer insulate the region from outside influence, it 
needs to find new ways to constrain others through dialogue and consultation (Acharya, 2003: 
149).  And that is precisely what ASEAN did with the issuance of the Manila Declaration.   
Fearing conflict with China over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (which are of both 
strategic and economic value), in 1992, the organization sought to diffuse a volatile situation by 
calling for a peaceful settlement of disputes in the region.  As point 5 of the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea states: “The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint 
in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and 
stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting the presently uninhabited 
islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive 
manner.”
xiii    
        As will be seen below, ASEAN also decided to expand its focus by giving rise to a new 
multilateral arrangement--the ASEAN Regional Forum--to deal with external as well as internal 
threats.  But it is important to understand that, as long as the close military dependence on the 
Western powers remains, ”no ASEAN country sees regional military cooperation as a substitute 
for security links with external powers” (Acharya 2003: 119), merely as an additional safety 
device meant to reduce the region’s dependence on the West over time.  
         A regional security conference was first mentioned by Gorbachev in 1986.  The idea was 
then picked up by Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, who proposed a Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled after the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  ASEAN members initially rejected this idea but were open to 
using ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences for further security discussions (Narine 2002: 103).  
Clear from the outset was that ASEAN sought to use its own model of cooperative security as a 
framework for promoting peace in the post-Cold War environment.  “Its underlying goal,” as 
Leifner (1996: 19) put it, “was to create the conditions for a stable…distribution of power among 
the three major Asia-Pacific states--China,  Japan and the United States--that would benefit 
regional order.”  After careful deliberations the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and 
Post Ministerial Conference, in July 1993, agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum.  
        The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held one year later in Bangkok on 25 July 1994.  
From its outset its founders conceptualized the organization as the principal forum for security 
cooperation in the region.  Comprised of 27 countries,
xiv
        The “ARF’s highest level [of interaction] is the annual foreign minister’s meeting, always 
chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating chairmanship” (Simon 2008: 279).  This 
meeting is supported by an annual Senior Officers Meeting (SOM).  Members of the ARF, 
additionally, have agreed to set up two structures to help the ARF-SOM Chairman: an Inter-
Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building “to address…a dialogue on security 
perceptions and defence policy papers,” and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs) “to deal with 
cooperative activities, including peacekeeping and search-and-rescue coordination” (Leifner 
1996: 42).  These groups are supplemented by specialists who meet in Track II meetings like the 
Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) founded in 1993 or the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) founded in 1994.
 the ARF is based on ASEAN-style 
diplomacy (non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-use of force, pacific settlement 
of disputes, consensus decision making, a preference for non-binding and non-legalistic 
approaches) and displays minimal institutionalization.  
xv  Or, put differently, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum engages in both “first track” (official) and “second track” (unofficial) diplomacy.   
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The former typically entails discussions by Foreign Ministers, whereas scholars, members of 
Think Tanks, government representatives not acting in their official capacity, as well as other 
individuals and organizations attend “second track” meetings on regional security issues.  
In their 1995 Concept Paper the ARF members envisioned a “three-stage, evolutionary approach”  
…moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and, in the long term, towards a 
conflict resolution capability.”
xvi
         Although the creation of trust is still paramount, since 2005 the ARF has sought to move 
from the Confidence Building stage to the Preventive Diplomacy phase.  As expressly stated in 
the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on “Confidence Building Measures and 
Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe” (Berlin, 12-14 March 2008), the ARF is “currently in 
the transition phase from confidence building to preventive diplomacy.”
xviii
  
         As will be discussed below, thus far, the ARF has largely made progress in the area of 
confidence building.  Since it took the organization until 2005 to declare that it was time to move 
into the preventive diplomacy (PD) stage, efforts to develop PD mechanisms (which according to 
the ARF Concept Paper would be “a natural follow-up to confidence building measures [CBMs]), 
not to speak of conflict management measures, are still at an embryonic stage.   
       What needs to be understood from the outset is that the ARF is split between activist 
(Australia, Canada, US, Japan) and reluctant (China and most of ASEAN) countries.  ASEAN 
countries reject a more formal ARF because they want to avoid taking any steps that would 
undermine the ASEAN way.  China, similarly, rejects greater formality because it opposes 
interference in its domestic affairs (particularly when it comes to Taiwan and the South China 
Sea).  Hence a “pace comfortable to all participants” needs to be found, which often undermines 
the effectiveness of the ARF as a regional security actor by leading to lowest common 
denominator decisions. 
        As Katsumata (2006: 194) explains, the “ARF is not designed to ‘resolve’… disputes--i.e., 
to reach a formal agreement, or to create a formal mechanism to regulate concerned states’ 
actions.”  It therefore could not prevent a number of conflicts between its members such as 
disputes between India and Pakistan, the diplomatic row between South Korea and Japan over 
Dokdo/Takeshima, China’s military intimidation in the Taiwan Strait, territorial disputes 
regarding the Spratlys or the South China Sea, to name but a few.    
Rather than to settle disputes, the ARF seeks to promote lasting peace by utilizing CBMs that are 
to create trust among its members.  Or, in other words, the ARF is about “identity-building” and 
its members hope that…”dialogue should lead to socialization which, in turn, will lead to the 
dissipation of conflicts of interests” (Garofano 1999: 78).  Comprehensive engagement and 
political dialogue, from the ARF’s perspective, are the  correct way to foster peace, not the 
dispatch of troops and carrier battle groups (Leifner 1996: 46).  Thus for the first ten years of its 
existence the ARF largely held workshops with the main purpose of disseminating the “ASEAN 
way” (non-use of force, non-interference in domestic affairs, etc.), thereby earning the label of a 
“norm brewery” (Katsumata 2006: 195). 
        In their efforts to promote peace, the ASEAN members of the ARF seek to retain control 
over the organization.  They do this by making sure that ASEAN states provide the venue for the 
ARF’s annual meetings.  Moreover, they insist that intersession study groups, which are 
composed of two states, always include an ASEAN member.  And, they mandate that the ASEAN 
consensus principle always prevails (Simon 2007: 22). 
xvii  The document 
explains that “[a]s mutual trust amongst ASEAN countries…and ARF participants had increased, 
the ARF was in a good position to advance into preventive diplomacy.”   Since the time has 
come to translate commitment into action, Mr. Wong Chow Ming, Deputy-Director at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, proposed to…”enhance concrete practical cooperation; 
streamline decision-making; strengthen [the] ARF Chair…maintain [a] ‘flexible moratorium’ on 
membership and enhance cooperation with Track II and external organizations.”
xix  Other steps to 
enhance CBMs and PD might include the improvement of communication between ARF  
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participants, information exchange mechanisms, and the creation of a crisis room or some other 
form of early warning mechanism.
xxiii
xx 
         Preventive diplomacy measures, as envisioned by the ARF, can be taken before a crisis 
and/or during its onset.  Pre-crisis measures include information exchanges on military exercises 
and weapons purchases; greater transparency via Defense White Papers; institution-building for 
consultation and exchange of personnel; norm-building; early warning systems to detect the 
build-up of military forces, natural disasters, refugee movements, famine, etc.
xxi  PD measures at 
the onset of a crisis, on the other hand, consist of fact finding; goodwill missions by envoys to 
express concern about a particular situation; mediation or the good offices of a third party to 
restore order (ibid). 
        From September 4-7 2007, for instance, an ARF Disaster Relief Desk-top Exercise was held 
in Darwin to develop an initial structure for ARF Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for 
Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance.  This was followed one month later by an ARF 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief in Helsinki were recommendations were made 
regarding the development of strategies and a procedure for enhanced inter-governmental 
cooperation in this area.  Specifically, ARF members discussed the improvement of military-to-
military and civilian-military coordination, including joint training and better information sharing 
in the pre-deployment and actual response phases.
xxii  The meeting also stressed that the ARF data 
base should complement existing UN mechanisms.   
         The ARF conducted a further Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief in Jakarta, 1-2 May 
2008, and pronounced it an important milestone in the organization’s move from confidence 
building mechanisms to preventive diplomacy.  At the same time, however, the Co-Chair’s 
Summary Report of the ARF Desktop Exercise emphasized that the ARF Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief Standard Operating Procedures (HADR SOP) must acknowledge 
the primacy of sovereignty and therefore are non-binding, that is, external assistance shall only be 
provided with the consent of the affected country.  
         In the area of energy security the ARF has also taken steps recently to promote greater 
cooperation and prevent conflict.  During their 2
nd Seminar on Energy Security 15-17 April 2008 
in Singapore ARF members, first of all, defined what security in this area means to them.  In their 
summary statement they made clear that they prefer a broad view that “includes not only energy 
diversification…, but also energy diplomacy, energy conservation, infrastructural challenges, 
environmental protection, and the development of alternative and renewable sources of 
energy.”
xxiv  Moreover, they noted that greater regional cooperation would be essential to assure 
the security of transit routes, and recommended several concrete steps to enhance energy security 
such as “information exchange and assistance on best practices; scenario planning exercises; and 
enhanced cooperation regarding the development and investment in new infrastructure” (ibid.). 
This past year there have also been signs that the ARF may soon be ready to set itself more 
ambitious goals and consider undertaking preventive actions in addition to preventive diplomacy.  
During its 2
nd Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting in Singapore 4-6 March 2008, the organization 
discussed the possibility of future participation in peacekeeping operations and called for 
“enhanced quality in training, the right equipment and the necessary political will.”
xxv
        The ARF, moreover, has made some progress regarding counter-terrorism.  The organization 
recognizes that terrorism “constitutes a grave threat to stability, peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific and beyond” and thus, repeatedly, has called upon its members to become parties to int’l 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
  The 
Japanese government, moreover, offered cooperation with peacekeeping training centers in the 
Asian region.  Those countries not ready to contribute forces, it was noted, could aid in other 
ways by providing health and medical services, military advisers and combat service support 
forces (ibid.).  Additionally, it was suggested that “future meetings could look at an integrated or 
comprehensive mission concept”…and consider “holding a peacekeeping planning 
exercise/activity in the future” (ibid. p.8).  
xxvi  During the Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum  
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Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Semarang, Indonesia, 
21-22 February 2008, for example, the need for cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism 
among regional organizations like ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ARF was stressed to ensure maximum synergies and avoid 
duplication.  Participants also “supported in principle” the proposal by the Republic of Korea to 
“explore practical and concrete ways” to implement previous ARF recommendations in “fighting 
cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space.”
xxvii
xxviii
  The meeting, moreover, discussed 
strategies to counter transnational crime, improve boundary control, and better deal with cross 
border crime through close cooperation between the authorities and the public.  Finally, the 
meeting addressed measures like bilateral agreements, intelligence exchanges, information 
sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and mutual legal assistance to fight transnational crime 
more effectively.   
Since the “prime model for the ARF is ASEAN’s own distinctive, political approach to regional 
security problems,” as Leifer (1996: 3) aptly put it, “conspicuously absent from the ARF is any 
robust provision for addressing the use of force in conflict and conflict resolution.”  Military 
intervention, peace-making, peace-enforcement or any other military instruments are clearly 
outside the purview of the ARF which consciously elects to rely exclusively on political and 
economic means.  This lack of “teeth,” according to Leifner (1996: 53), renders the ARF an 
“imperfect diplomatic instrument for achieving regional security goals.” 
         The lack of measures to compel others to engage in certain types of behavior may make the 
ARF imperfect, but does it also make it ineffective?  “Despite being labeled a ‘talk shop,’” 
Acharya (2003: 332) points out that the ARF ”fulfills the expected function of institutions in 
lowering transaction costs, providing information and preventing cheating.”  The ARF clearly has 
promoted regional stability via the creation of CBMs and numerous venues for the exchange of 
ideas and building of trust.  Japan, for instance, views the organization as a “vehicle for 
enhancing [the] overall diplomatic climate between regional countries and as  an important 
element of its policy of engagement with China and North Korea” (Yuzawa 2007: 177).  The 
Japanese know that many of their neighbors are still distrustful and the ARF provides a welcome 
setting for reassurances.  Similarly, as China’s military  and economic power grows, it 
increasingly has an interest in signaling its peaceful intentions and interacting with its neighbors 
in a multilateral institutional setting.  And even though China, when it first joined the ARF, was 
concerned that the US and Japan might gang up on it, it quickly concluded that staying out was 
too risky and therefore not an option (ibid. 32). 
         Much like Acharya (2003: 170) has found in the case of ASEAN, it can be argued that 
“persisting bilateral tensions, territorial disputes, [and] militarization” also undermine the ARF’s 
effectiveness as a viable regional security provider.  What one continues to see is a gradual, 
piecemeal approach to cooperation where the norm of non-interference, the consensus principle, 
the lack of institutionalization, and the absence of interoperability constrain policy options, and 
where undesirable behavior by a member, for the most part, still goes unpunished. 
        To enhance security in the region, and assure that countries like Japan and the US will not 
lose interest in the ARF, “tangible progress” has to be made, particularly with respect to the non-
interference principle (Yusawa 2007: 170, and 2006: 804).  So long as states have either asked for 
or consented to intervention by the ARF, Japan for instance thinks, the organization should be 
allowed to play a role in intrastate conflict.  In such cases, as long as preventive diplomacy 
measures were to be authorized by the states involved, their use would neither violate state 
sovereignty nor the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others (Yuzawa 2006: 
790).  Put differently, activist ARF members like Australia, the US, Canada, and Japan think it is 
important to depart from the rules that characterize the “ASEAN Way” in order for the 
organization to develop more meaningful PD mechanisms.  Even at that, in the eyes of Yuzawa 
(2006: 786), such a departure “would only be a prerequisite, not a solution.”   
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        The ARF also needs to rethink the consensus principle which often gets in the way of joint 
agreements.  This obstacle, according to Simon (2007: 25), could be dealt with if ARF members 
were willing to adopt an ASEAN procedure known as the “ASEAN Minus X” understanding.  
The latter essentially allows for a “coalition of  the willing,” and thus, makes it possible to 
progress in situations where not everyone is able/willing to move at the same speed.  Since 
inclusivity can hinder progress, it sometimes may be better to seek cooperation among a smaller 
number of players to reach agreement rather than trying to get everyone on board (Garofano 
1999: 84).  Such a move, however, can be expected to be rejected by more reluctant ARF 
members like China and most of ASEAN.  
        Additionally, there is a need for greater institutionalization.  Since an early warning system, 
for example, requires a mechanism to collect data, either a permanent secretariat or something 
like a Regional Risk Reduction Center will have to be put in place to make concrete progress in 
this area (Yuzawa 2006: 801).  At the same time, even though some ASEAN members and China 
have been hesitant to give greater powers to the ARF Chair, it seems to make sense to create a 
triumvirate--comprised of present, immediate past and prospective chairmen (Tay with Talib 
1997: 264)--as found in the EU Commission to assure some continuity and promote institutional 
learning.  
        Further undermining the ARF’s effectiveness is the absence of interoperability and, to date, 
pretty much an unwillingness or inability to set up effective arrangements to cope with 
transnational challenges (Simon 2007: 30).  As discussed above, there has been significant 
progress with respect to confidence-building measures, but much fewer tangible results can be 
seen in the area of PD.  
        But, as alluded to above, the real Achilles heel of the ARF is its lack of enforcement 
mechanisms or sanctions.  As is, the organization has no way to punish members who choose not 
to comply with its norms and rules.  In the case of North Korea, for instance, ARF members so 
far have done no more than express their concern over the DPRK’s failure to meet the 
requirements for a declaration of its nuclear programs and repeatedly called for progress in the 
Six-Party talks.  Similarly, during the recent unrest in Myanmar, ARF members essentially did no 
more than voice their concern and urge the government to promote peaceful change and 
reconciliation.  To become more effective in situations like the ones described above, the 
organization would have to develop contingency-planning against any members within the 
grouping, come up with formal and/or informal dispute settlement mechanisms, or try to resolve 
conflicts via compromise (Garofano 1999: 84-89). 
          Given the history of the region, East Asians are sensitive to infringements on their 
sovereignty and, rather than to curtail their freedom of action, prefer to begin by building mutual 
trust, respect, and tolerance through regular talks and then graduate to more ambitious goals.  
“[C]onfidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution,” according to 
Lee (1997: 262), are the bottom line, and multilateral institutions, by “redefin[ing] identities and 
acceptable standards of behavior” (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 120), and promoting greater 
transparency, are a good way of getting there.    
   
External Relations 
 
In addition to the ARF, ASEAN holds annual summit meetings with China, Japan, and South 
Korea in the ASEAN Plus Three framework.  ASEAN is also engaged in trade relations with the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum,
xxix but insists on remaining an independent 
body within APEC, and that APEC decisions remain non-binding and will not impinge on the 
sovereignty of ASEAN members (Narine 2002: 124).  Unlike the US, which expects tangible 
economic benefits, Asian countries view APEC as a regional confidence building measure, 
largely put in place to promote trust (ibid 125).   
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        Most ASEAN members, furthermore, participate in the East Asia-Latin America Forum 
(EALAF) and, due to ASEAN’s reputation as an economic powerhouse, in 1996, it managed to 
engage the European Union in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)--“the main multilateral channel 
for communication between Asia and Europe [which seeks to] strengthen interaction and mutual 
understanding between the two regions through dialogue.”
xxx  But, as Henderson (1999: 74) 
points out, enlargement “has limited ASEAN’s manoeuvrability in its relations with key Western 
partners, and diluted its identity in ASEM and APEC.”   
 
 
 
Theories 
 
On the one hand, there are intergovernmentalists like Leifner (1989) who view ASEAN as an 
instrument of the member states.   As rational actors, we are told, these states conduct cost/benefit 
analyses and pursue their self-interest rather than common interests.  ASEAN states remain in 
charge of the integration process and cooperation is possible only when it serves their interest.  
Member states stand in the way of regional integration when it does not serve their needs.
xxxi  
Thus, as long as ASEAN provides real benefits without interfering with sovereignty 
requirements, it is in members’ interest to support the organization.  What we see is states 
responding rationally to changes in their economic and security environment.  When interests 
converge, integration proceeds. 
        On the other hand, constructivists like Acharya (2001) argue that it makes more sense to take 
a sociological approach to explain Southeast Asian regionalism.  According to him, norms, values 
and practices have socialized ASEAN members into adopting a shared regional identity, and have 
become part of their self-identities.  So it is a sense of “we-feeling” that explains regional 
cooperation, rather than cost/benefit calculations.  
         Since things are seldom that black and white, I agree with Narine (2002: 1) that, in the case 
of ASEAN, the “truth lies between these polar positions.”  Rationality and identity, material and 
social factors are clearly interwoven, and focusing on only one set of variables would leave us 
with an underspecified, incomplete explanation.  Or, put differently, to understand, for instance, 
which effect identities have on institutions and actors’ interests, an amalgamation of rational 
choice and sociological approaches --what Hemmer and Katzenstein  (2002: 599) refer to as 
“analytical eclecticism”--appears to be a necessity.  
 
Setbacks and Prospects 
 
ASEAN has clearly been an important source of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.  Its 
greatest achievement to date, arguably, may have been its united stand over the problem of 
Kampuchea where it “condemned military intervention and focused on creating international 
diplomatic pressure for Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea (Tan 2000: 345). 
        The organization, however, also suffered its share of setbacks.  Of the many problems 
ASEAN confronted over the decades, three will be briefly mentioned below, namely, the Asian 
economic crisis, regional haze, and the political upheaval in East Timor. 
        Due in large part to investor panic and poor regulatory regimes, particularly with respect to 
banking, in May 1997, Asia experienced a severe economic crisis that lasted for almost 2 years. 
Like other regional organizations, ASEAN was helpless.  Divergent strategic perspectives, 
quickly, caused its members to abandon any sense of regionalism and to seek their own solutions.  
In doing so they “shattered [the organization’s] credibility as a regional leader and an economic 
regime” (Narine 2002: 139).  
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During the 1990s, the region also suffered from haze brought about by large  forest fires in 
Indonesia that resulted from improper logging techniques.  As neighboring countries were 
disappearing in heavy smoke, ASEAN’s environmental ministers agreed to cooperate to prevent 
such fires in the future and to learn how to deal with them more effectively on a regional basis.  
ASEAN’s norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, however, made finding a 
solution to the problem difficult.  Since Indonesia was unwilling to put regional interests ahead of 
its ruling elites’ economic interests, ASEAN’s hands were tied and it could do no more than to 
monitor the fires and lend a hand in trying to put them out.  Prevention, had to be left up to the 
individual governments. 
 
        The norm of non-interference rendered ASEAN equally powerless during the conflict in East 
Timor which dates back to 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor.  Almost one third of East 
Timor’s population died under Indonesian occupation and it took the former until 1999 to gain 
independence from the latter.  The vote for independence, in turn, led to killings by militias, 
prompting the UN to establish a peacekeeping force in the country (Narine 2002: 172).  
Meanwhile, ASEAN continued to support Indonesia’s control of East Timor, fearful of other 
separatist movements in other ASEAN states.  As so many times in the past, the organization was 
divided over which policies to pursue.  While Myanmar opposed any external intervention, 
Vietnam disapproved of the role played by the UN.  Thailand and the Philippines were most 
willing to change the principle of nonintervention and therefore made the largest contributions to 
the UN operation (Narine 2002: 174).  In the end, ASEAN decided to defend Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity declaring that “a united, democratic and economically prosperous Indonesia is 
basic to the maintenance of regional security.”
xxxii    
         What these examples hit home is that ASEAN is about state-building and the protection of 
sovereignty which matters so greatly to its members because they are “institutionally weak.”  
Since “[t]heir political legitimacy is usually under threat from within their own borders,” Narine 
2002: 193) explains, ASEAN members seek to “forge common national identities out of 
…divergent parts. …Their focus on constructing national identities helps to explain the primacy 
of sovereignty within ASEAN” (ibid. 199). 
        Yet, without the willingness on the part of its members to modify the principle of non-
interference and allow the organization to become more interventionary, ASEAN risks losing 
credibility internationally, and is likely to lose its appeal to at least some of its members 
(Henderson 1999: 76).  Aware of this predicament, since the mid-1990s, ASEAN has given a fair 
amount of thought to how best to improve its effectiveness.  In 1995, for instance, ASEAN 
members agreed that a “consensus minus” principle could be used for economic decision-making, 
where ASEAN could take positions without a consensus, provided the interests of hesitant 
countries would not be affected (Henderson 1999: 48).  A couple of years later, Anwar Ibrahim, 
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, proposed “constructive intervention.”  This entails “closer 
cooperation between advanced and less-advanced ASEAN members to promote regional 
development but not  uninvited intervention in the internal affairs of member states” (Narine 
2002: 168).  Affected states would have to invite ASEAN’s involvement and intervention would 
be political and economic, not military. 
         The following year, Thailand’s foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan, advanced the concept of 
“flexible engagement.”  It “involves publicly commenting on and collectively discussing fellow 
members’ domestic policies when these have either regional implications or adversely affect the 
disposition of other ASEAN members” (ibid.).  But all other ASEAN members, except for the 
Philippines, were opposed to the idea, fearing it would lead to mistrust and renew tensions.  
Instead, at the July 1998 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, agreement was reached to practice 
“enhanced interaction.”  This would make it acceptable for individual ASEAN states to comment 
on their neighbors’ domestic activities if those activities affected regional concerns, but ASEAN 
itself would not intervene (ibid.).  
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        For the time being it seems likely that, ”while mutual interests will keep ASEAN together, 
fissiparous tendencies will strain its seams” (Broinowski 1990: 241).  Although, when compared 
to the EU, ASEAN is light years away in terms of degree of integration, there is no denying that it 
has been a success story in its own right.  Trust has grown among members and the organization 
has managed to promote stability and economic growth over the course of more than four 
decades.  
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